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Abstract
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This paper attempts to quantify the impact of the HIV/
AIDS epidemic on social capital with cross-country 
data. Using data from the World Values Survey, the 
authors estimate reduced-form regressions of the main 
determinants of social capital controlling for HIV 
prevalence, institutional quality, social distance, and 
economic indicators. The results obtained indicate 
that HIV prevalence affects social capital negatively. 
The empirical estimates suggest that a one standard 
deviation increase in HIV prevalence will lead to a 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to  support the drivers of growth and foster an enabling environment for business in Africa. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at adavid2@
worldbank.org.  
decline of at least 1 percent in trust, controlling for other 
determinants of social capital. Moving from a country 
with a relatively low level of HIV prevalence, such as 
Estonia, to a country with a relatively high level, such 
as Uganda, there is a more than 11 % point decline in 
social capital. These results are robust in a number of 
dimensions and highlight the empirical importance of an 
additional mechanism through which HIV/AIDS hinders 
the development process.  
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 1. Introduction 
Putnam (1993, p.167) conceptualizes social capital as "…features of social 
organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating co-ordinated actions.”  Although the concept of social capital is 
frequently used in rather vague ways by a large part of the social sciences literature, the 
key element is that ‘relationships matter’ (Field, 2003). Social interaction enables 
members to share values and build societies.  Therefore, social networks (and the 
relations of trust, tolerance and cooperation arising from them) allow members to resolve 
their collective problems more easily, facilitate community progress, and achieve goals. 
The World Bank claims that “Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion — 
social capital — is critical for poverty alleviation and sustainable human and economic 
development
1”. In fact, there have been a growing number of efforts attempting to 
quantify the influence of social capital on economic development, as we discuss in the 
main text. Furthermore, several authors have linked the HIV/AIDS epidemic to social 
capital (see for instance Gaffeo, 2003), usually pointing out how factors related to the 
disease such as stigma,  discrimination and the costs posed by care for the sick as well as 
orphans erode and put pressure on social capital.  
The objective of this paper is to attempt to quantify the impact of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic on social capital using cross-country data. For this purpose, we will estimate 
reduced form regressions of the main determinants, as identified in the literature, of 
social capital, using national levels of trust from the World Values Survey (WVS) as a 
proxy for social capital. To our knowledge, there have been no previous efforts to 
evaluate this empirical question.  Establishing an empirical link between the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and “trust” helps uncover another channel through which social capital affects 
development. 
With this objective in mind, in section 2 we briefly examine the links between 
social capital, development and HIV/AIDS previously identified in the literature. In 
section 3 we present and discuss the data used in our cross-country regressions.  Section 4 





  2presents our empirical results and discusses the robustness of these results.  Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2.   Brief literature review  
2.1. Social capital and development 
When one goes through the literature on social capital, it is immediately apparent 
that trust, social networks, and social norms are the main mechanisms through which 
social capital reduces uncertainty and transaction costs, discourages opportunistic 
behavior, fosters cooperation and increases the efficiency of markets and organizations, 
thus affecting economic development.  Indeed, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) argue that 
social capital is growth enhancing mainly because a) it improves the functioning of 
public institutions and b) it helps to offset the effects of market imperfections by reducing 
search costs and facilitating economic transactions.  Routledge and von Amsberg (2003), 
for instance, present a theoretical model where social capital affects economic growth by 
facilitating cooperative trade.   
The influential paper by Zak and Knack (2001) formalizes the ideas previously 
outlined and develops a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and moral 
hazard to determine how trust varies across societies.  Agents decide how much to save 
and the time they will spend in investigating brokers who have an incentive to cheat their 
clients.  Of course, cheaters are not trustworthy and face sanctions by formal institutions 
and informal institutions (e.g. social ties, religious institutions) which are modeled as 
‘distance’ or similarities between people.  This, in turn prevents cheating and affects the 
time agents spend in verifying cheaters’ actions.   In this set-up, trust enhances growth by 
increasing savings and lowering transaction costs. The model also implies that trust 
increases with both formal and informal institutions, homogenous population and more 
egalitarian societies. In addition, the model predicts that societies can get stuck in low-
trust poverty traps. 
As far as the empirical evidence on the link between social capital and 
development is concerned, Knack and Keefer (1997) using cross-country data find that 
trust and civic norms are significantly related to economic growth and investment. Knack 
(2002) finds that social trust leads to better governance. Zak and Knack (2001) test 
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Keefer sample using later waves of the WVS that includes a number of developing 
countries. They corroborate the conclusion that trust affects economic growth. 
Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) perform a robustness analysis of the relationship between trust 
and economic growth and conclude that the Zak and Knack results are highly robust in 
terms of statistical significance of the estimated coefficients and reasonably robust in 
terms of size of the estimated effects.  
Another strand of the literature links social capital with financial development, as 
it identifies high levels of trust as one of the main determinants of financial depth. Guiso 
et al. (2004) measure variations in social capital within Italy through (anonymous) blood 
donation and (non-mandatory) electoral participation.  They show that, after controlling 
for income and wealth, high social capital areas use more checks, invest less in cash and 
more in stocks, have higher access to formal credit and borrow less from friends or 
relatives. Nonetheless, as well argued by Sabatini (2006), indicators such as blood 
donation and electoral participation might be outcomes of social capital rather than a 
measure of social capital itself.  Garretsen et al. (2004) also show that, after controlling 
for legal norms, societal norms help to explain market capitalization and hence cross-
country differences in financial development. They obtain their indicators for social 
norms from survey data about the values of people working in local subsidiaries of IBM 
in more than 50 countries.  
In addition, social capital may influence social learning and information diffusion 
through reducing the cost of information acquisition, lessening the uncertainty regarding 
the reliability of the information and increasing the willingness to cooperate and share 
information. Barr (2000) presents a model where networks facilitate knowledge flows 
between firms and as a result, firm productivity increases which might lead to sustained 
growth. Her empirical analysis for the manufacturing sector in Ghana shows that 
entrepreneurs with large and more diverse networks have firms that are more productive 
because they benefit not only from their direct contacts but also from the networking of 
their contacts.  Katungi and Smale (2006) draw attention to a gender twist in the way that 
social capital influences information exchanged among rural households in Uganda.     
Male-headed households participate more in civic engagement and social institutions than 
  4their female counterparts do, so they have more access to information and an advantage 
on agricultural innovation to improve the productivity of bananas. 
We will see next that unlike the large literature linking social capital and growth, 
research relating social capital and HIV/AIDS is still very scarce.  
 
2.2.  HIV/AIDS and development  
There is an emerging consensus that HIV/AIDS (mortality and morbidity) is an 
impediment to growth. However, the specific channels through which HIV/AIDS affects 
growth are subject to recent research
2.  
Most of the empirical simulations, like the one by Cuddington (1993) for 
Tanzania,  are based in Solow type growth models where  HIV/AIDS  affects the size of 
the labor force, increases expenditure on health, decreases both public and private 
savings, decreases investment in physical capital and lowers productivity.   
In addition to these more evident effects, HIV/AIDS contributes to the persistence 
of poverty as it affects not only the stock, but also the accumulation of human capital. 
Bell et al. (2004) calibrate an overlapping generation model for South Africa where the 
level of human capital and the premature mortality in the present generation affect the 
human capital of the next generation. When parents die prematurely, orphans are 
threatened by financial distress and lack of care.  This might increase the incidence of 
child labor and reduce both schooling and human capital
3. Nevertheless, even when 
parents are alive, their perception of their children’s possible premature death might 
lower the expected returns to education and reduce children’s schooling.  That is, adult 
premature mortality and the subjective assessment of children’s mortality generate 
poverty and possibly, poverty traps.   They predict that family income could be up to 
23,000 Rand lower by 2050 compared with the No-AIDS scenario. Bell et al. (2006) 
perform a similar exercise for Kenya and conclude that by 2040, GDP per adult will be 
11% less than it would have been in the No-AIDS Scenario for that country. 
                                                 
2 See Haacker (2004) for a comprehensive review of the literature on the economic effects of HIV/AIDS. 
3Wobst and  Arndt (2004) show that the labour force in Tanzania in 2000-01 became younger compared to 
1990-91 and that this trend coincided with lower enrolment and more exits in primary school as well as 
with the increase in HIV/AIDS infections and deaths.    
  5According to the well-known literature of ‘insurance’ motives and fertility 
decisions, uncertainty of children’s survival may not only have an effect on school 
enrolment but also on fertility decisions.    Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) examines the impact of 
the epidemic on fertility decisions in a panel of 44 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 
and concludes that HIV/AIDS affects the total fertility rate positively and school 
enrollment rates negatively.  She argues that those results are consistent with theoretical 
models of precautionary demand for children in the face of uncertainty about child 
survival. That is, in a high mortality environment, parents will choose to have more 
children and provide each child with less education. Hence, HIV/AIDS would contribute 
to reversing the fertility transition and accumulation of human capital leading to 
significant negative long-run effects on growth and welfare. In contrast, Young (2005) 
uses micro data from 27 SSA countries and finds that the HIV epidemic decreases 
fertility and has no systematic influence on human capital. He argues that this decline is 
associated with behavioral changes such as increased use of condoms.  Young’s 
regressions might be picking up a specific fertility pattern and response to the epidemic.   
This is more so if there are substantial variations within and across African countries in 
HIV prevalence that make empirical results difficult to generalize (Beegle and de 
Walque, 2008). We are less convinced about Young’s calculations that the decline in 
fertility brought about by the epidemic will create sufficient resources for medical care to 
fight the epidemic.  He argues that a decline in fertility will lower dependency ratios, 
increase savings rates, provide future cohorts with more capital per person, and make it 
possible to allocate resources for medical care.   However, resources are not only needed 
to fight the epidemic but to combat extreme poverty and malnutrition, which were 
already pervasive before the onset of the epidemic and have contributed to its 
transmission. This trade off and changes in labor force composition (as a consequence of 
the epidemic) should also be factored in his calculations.   
Besides the direct health costs of the disease, the nature and the way HIV/AIDS is 
transmitted has mainly created: a) social stigma and discrimination frequently attached to 
infected individuals which threaten to break family and community ties (Gaffeo, 2003) 
and b) market failures because of asymmetric information and externalities (Gersovitz 
and Hammer, 2003).  The scope for public intervention arises from the uncertainty 
  6regarding individuals’ infection status and the impossibility of verifying if one’s partner 
is engaging in safe sex with someone that has a positive probability of being infected
4. 
Recall that in Zak and Knack (2001), uncertainty, asymmetric information and 
moral hazard implies resources diverted in ‘uncovering’ cheaters instead of increasing 
output. They also show that discrimination (‘dissimilar agents’) lowers trust and 
consequently lowers growth.  Similarly, in the case of HIV/AIDS, uncertainty and 
asymmetric information and the impossibility of monitoring sexual behavior have both a 
direct effect on human lives (and output) and an indirect effect through trust.    Moreover, 
the epidemic is also associated with stigma and discrimination, which also lowers trust. 
That is, there is a direct and indirect link between HIV/AIDS and development.  
 In addition, a number of authors argue that HIV/AIDS also poses a considerable 
burden on traditional networks and coping mechanisms, in particular in what concerns 
care for orphans and sick individuals. Foster (2006) for instance, argues that governments 
have been slow to react to the orphan crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa that is intimately 
linked to the epidemic causing families and communities to, in his words, “shoulder most 
of the effort and costs”. This strain on social networks could lead to a negative impact on 
social capital or even to the disintegration of the existing informal mechanisms to cope 
with economic shocks.  
Besides the impact of HIV/AIDS on households, Haacker (2004) posits that 
HIV/AIDS can also influence the ‘social fabric’ of the country (e.g. social coherence and 
governance), which in turn could affect economic development. He argues that the 
epidemic contributes to deteriorating security at the individual, community and national 
level, in particular as governments’ capacities are eroded leading to increased crime and 
instability. This author also states that the epidemic could increase the vulnerability of a 
country to civil war.  
Others instead, have studied the effect of social capital on health. For instance, 
Poortinga (2006) shows that for European countries, individual levels of social trust and 
civic participation were strongly correlated with self-rated health.  Campbell et al. (2002) 
focus on the impact of social capital on health issues in a South African mining 
community.  Social capital is defined in terms of people's membership in voluntary 
                                                 
4 See Dasgupta (2005) for a discussion on trust and credibility and the role of an external enforcer.   
  7community associations and they tested if members were less likely to have HIV. They 
found mixed results that varied across age and gender.  
Overall, one can conclude that HIV/AIDS affects growth directly but also 
indirectly through fertility, human capital and social capital.  In terms of social capital,  
the epidemic increases insecurity, stigma and discrimination and poses extra burdens on 
traditional social networks The question that we will attempt to answer in subsequent 
sections is how large and strong this effect is. This will allow us to assess the importance 
of this indirect channel through which HIV/AIDS affects the development process. 
 
3. Regression framework and overview of the data  
 
To explore if HIV determines social capital, we will present the results from a 
number of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the form  
i i X i HIV i Capital Social ε γ β α + + + = /  
where α is the constant,   is a vector containing other explanatory variables,  and   i X i ε  is 
a random error term. The estimated coefficient β  measures how sensitive social capital 
is to HIV prevalence and it is of particular interest to us.  
      Firstly, to test the above model we need to have a reasonable measure of social 
capital. Durlauf (2002) and Sabatini (2006) discuss in detail the extensive challenges 
present in the empirical analysis of social capital, in particular, flaws in studies linking 
social capital to economic growth.  Firstly, social capital is a multidimensional concept so 
it is not possible to have a single definition.  There is agreement that social capital 
includes elements of trust, social norms, and social networks i.e.  all aspects  of social 
structure that makes groups work more efficiently.  Secondly, a number of the indicators 
commonly used are measures of outcomes of social capital rather than social capital 
itself.  Others rely on subjective perceptions that depend on the economic, social and 
historical context of the individuals being surveyed. Moreover, technical econometric 
difficulties abound such as identification problems, reverse causality, measurement error, 
among others.  
  8The main dependent variable in our regressions is a measure of social capital 
obtained from cross-country data on national levels of trust from the World Values 
Survey (WVS). Using a nationally representative sample
5, the WVS provides a measure 
of “trust” given by the percentage of the population who answer yes to the question: “In 
general, do you think that most people can be trusted?” against the alternative that “you 
can’t be too careful when dealing with people”. We use data from the latest waves of the 
survey, which includes six Sub-Saharan African countries (only Nigeria and South Africa 
were available in previous surveys).  We list all the countries included in this study in 
Appendix A.   
An alternative aggregate measure of social capital proposed by Temple (1998) is 
the “social capability” index which is an assessment of a “society’s suitability for 
institutional and economic development”. Nonetheless, this measure was constructed in 
the early 1960s and therefore would not be suitable for our purposes because the first 
cases of AIDS where identified in the early 1980s. Another measure for social capital is 
participation in voluntary associations but it is inadequate for our objectives because they 
are not widely available across countries and they might be outcomes rather than 
indicators of social capital.  
Furthermore, the empirical work by Bjonskov (2003) lends support to our choice 
of “trust”.  He applies principal component analysis on data provided by the World Value 
Survey (WVS) and shows that although trust, norms and networks tend to co-vary, there 
are distinct elements. More interestingly, he explores the sensitivity of these components 
by including each one as regressors in cross-country regressions and finds that only the 
social trust component is robust to different specifications.  He obtains similar qualitative 
results when using the variable ”trust” from the WVS, which was also used by Knack and 
Keefer (1997) and Zack and Knack (2001) in their growth regressions.  
Nonetheless, one has to acknowledge that this particular measure of social capital 
has been subject to a number of criticisms in the literature.  One concern relates to the 
fact that it reflects individual perceptions of society and that one needs to take into 
                                                 
5 Sabatini (2006) observes that urban areas and better educated persons are usually overrepresented in the 
WVS but Delhey and Newton (2005) argue that these problems do not seriously affect the randomness of 
the sample.  Knack and Keefer (1997) provides empirical validity for the use of WVS data when they found  
a strong correlation between  WVS trust and  the number of wallets that were ‘lost’ and  returned intact  in 
an experiment carried out in Europe and the United States.    
  9account the social and historical context in which those perceptions are formed and the 
timing when the survey questions were asked. Other caveats relate to the different 
interpretations respondents might have of the question asked and their perception of trust 
given dissimilar risk preferences (i.e. those who are more risk averse may be less likely to 
trust others).  
Secondly, we need to identify the other correlates of trust.  We collected data on a 
number of determinants of trust that we identified in the existing literature and discussed 
in the previous section.  Those include HIV prevalence rates, governance indexes, 
measures of the quality of institutions (in particular regarding the control of corruption) 
and measures of social distance such as income inequality, ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization. We also control for population density because spatial distance may 
negatively affect the formation of networks and the flow of information.  However, areas 
with high population density can overwhelm public services and are likely to display 
more heterogeneity and lower trust.  What is more, population density has been 
associated with higher levels of crime.  In addition, people living in rural areas are said to 
be more trusting than people living in large urban areas (Collier, 2002; Delhey and 
Newton, 2005).  Note that Japan is a country with high population density, large urban 
areas and low levels of crime. Therefore, the strength and sign of the correlation between 
population density and trust are by no means clear.  Like Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), 
we include measures of educational achievement as determinants of trust. Using 
individual level data for the United States, they find that “successful people” in terms of 
income and educational achievement tend to trust more.  
 We also included the log of initial GDP (as measured by Dollar and Kraay, 2002) 
as a possible determinant of trust in some specifications. In the Zak and Knack (2001) 
moral hazard model, trust is decreasing with wealth but increasing in wages
6.  Following 
this logic, the impact of the log of initial GDP (the proxy for those two economic factors 
at the national level) on trust is ambiguous. 
  Finally note that there is empirical evidence conducted for America (Glaeser et 
al, 2002) and Britain (Li et al, 2005) showing that generalized trust tends to increase with 
                                                 
6 The intuition here is that investors have more incentives to monitor brokers’ behavior to protect their 
wealth but in the model, wages are considered to be the opportunity cost of investigating a broker so if this 
cost is high, there are more incentives to trust the broker. 
  10age.  Younger adults seem to be less trusting than middle age or older because of 
lifecycle effects.  As people get older, they have more experience, interact more with 
others and participate more in different organizations.  This might imply that at the 
country level, countries with younger populations trust less than countries with older 
populations.   On the other hand, there might also be a generational cohort effect because 
of their own experiences like wars, famines and political scandals resulting in new 
generations being less trusting
7.    
  Finally, given that our sample includes a mix of countries, we include a 
Scandinavian dummy variable and, when appropriate, a developing country dummy 
variable. The Scandinavian
8 countries rank top in social trust and are known to have a 
strong basis for trust because of their good governance and high levels of government 
transparency, their ethics and culture, and their universal high quality welfare state 
program
9.   
Appendix B provides more description of data and sources. Appendix C presents 
the correlation matrix between the main regressors as well as their descriptive statistics. 
Some variables are highly correlated and we should bear this in mind when performing 
our regression.   This is particularly the case for variables measuring institutional quality.  
Note as well that the developing country indicator is negative and highly correlated with 
both the measures of institutional quality and initial income; an initial income is highly 
positively correlated with variables measuring institutional quality.   
 
4. Empirical results  
Many econometric difficulties are likely to arise when estimating cross-country 
regressions of the determinants of national levels of social capital (measured by trust) and 
might result in biased and inconsistent estimates.  
It is clear that several of the variables included in the regressions might suffer 
from measurement error.  The precise number of people living with HIV/AIDS is not 
                                                 
7 Recently, Guiso et al (2007) build an overlapping generation model in which parents transmit their priors 
about trust to their children who then, will transmit it to their children after updating their beliefs according 
to what they experience in real world.   This explains persistence and “low trust equilibrium” traps.   
8 By Scandinavian countries we mean Denmark, Norway and Sweden.   We reserve the term Nordic 
countries  for Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland.   
9 See Allum et al (2007) and Delhey and Newton (2005) and Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) for a discussion 
about why these countries are top in the trust ranking. 
  11known with certainty. In particular, it is well-known that the quality of data concerning 
HIV prevalence rates is rather poor.   The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) uses different sets of data (e.g. surveys of pregnant women attending 
antenatal clinics, surveillance information, population based surveys, vital statistics, etc.) 
to calculate HIV prevalence. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), one of 
UNAIDS data sources, have recently collected more accurate and reliable data on 
prevalence rates particularly in Africa, but the cross-country availability of such data is 
very limited.  Measurement error can also be present in other variables (like the 
governance indicators) included in our regressions. However, in the case of our 
dependent variable (trust), OLS is suitable if the measurement error is uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables.   
 Note that UNAIDS has warned against comparing HIV/AIDS prevalence data 
across time because the assumptions, methodology and data used to produce the 
estimates change over time with improved knowledge of the disease and superior 
statistical methods
10 .   For this reason and given problems of data availability, we are 
unable to use panel data (or at least specify our regression in first differences) to control 
for possible unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. correlation between unobserved and observed 
country characteristics).  
Omitted variables could present another serious potential problem so we try to 
control for the different determinants of trust identified in the literature. Perhaps more 
worrying is the possible endogeneity of the HIV prevalence rate. We attempt to mitigate 
this problem by ensuring that whenever possible, this variable is pre-determined i.e. we 
include values for periods before the WVS surveys took place.  In addition, we also 
estimate the model using instrumental variables (IV).  Finally, among other difficulties, 
the presence of multiple regimes and non-linearities in the relationships studied is a clear 
possibility.  
Bearing those caveats in mind, table 1 presents results from a number of Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regressions.  It is remarkable that the estimated coefficient of HIV 
prevalence has a negative and statistically significant (at conventional levels) impact on 
trust through all the specifications. Specifications (2) and (3) confirm that the control of 
                                                 
10 See UNAIDS (2007).  
  12corruption index and developing countries dummy variable are multicolinear, and 
because the institutional quality indices are highly and significant correlated, we do not 
include the developing country dummy in the following regressions. 
 Specification (5) includes as explanatory variables: HIV prevalence, the rule of 
law index constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2006) and data on ethnic fractionalization 
from Alesina et al. (2003). As expected, both the estimated coefficients for HIV 
prevalence and ethnic fractionalization present negative signs, although the latter is not 
statistically significant, whereas the rule of law index presents a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient.  Under this specification, a 1 percentage point increase in HIV 
prevalence would result in a 0.76 percentage point decrease in trust.  Alternatively, a one 
standard deviation increase in HIV prevalence will lead to just over 2.5 percentage point 
decline in trust. The RESET test rejects the null hypothesis (model is linear) at the 10% 
level but not at 5%, which is acceptable given the small sample size.  Including linguistic 
instead of ethnic fractionalization does not qualitatively change the results.  We also 
tested the regressions including a quadratic term for ethnic or linguistic fractionalization 
because according to Zak and Knack (2001) in settings with a large number of small 
groups, no single group represents much of a threat to others; therefore, the effective 
social distance is greatest at an intermediate range of the fractionalization measure.  The 
results were qualitatively similar
11 , the fractionalization variables were statistically 
insignificant but HIV prevalence and the rule of law variable are statistically significant 
at conventional levels. 
  Specifications (7) through (11) regress trust on HIV prevalence, rule of law 
index, the Gini coefficient for income inequality as a proxy for social distance, the log of 
initial income, population density and average age of the population. Rule of law has 
always a positive and significant effect on trust except in (9) when we include (the log of) 
initial income because, as stated earlier,   both variables are highly correlated.   
Unexpectedly, the estimated coefficient of educational achievement has a negative sign 
although statistically insignificant. Similar to other studies, we find that the Gini 
                                                 
11 Not reported in table1 for ease of exposition , but available upon request 
  13coefficient is an important determinant of trust
12 (i.e. greater income inequality reduces 
trust). We find a significant and negative relation between population density and trust. 
But our results suggest that countries with older populations seem to trust less. This 
contrasts with the findings of researchers like Li et al (2005) who found that older people 
are more trusting than younger people are because they have higher levels of 
neighborhood attachment and civic participation. On the other hand, it is possible that as 
people grow older, their life experience make them less naïve and less trusting.  
We also report (but do not present in Table 1) that we estimated specifications 
that included the percentage of rural population in 1996 from the World Development 
Indicators as a regressor. In most cases, the estimated coefficient had the expected 
positive sign but was not statistically significant across different specifications.   We also 
explore different measures of “age” such as the ratio of population below 30 years old to 
population above 30 years old.  These results consistently suggested that older 
populations trust more but they were not statistically significant.  
 The RESET test for specifications (10) and (11) rejects the assumption that the 
model is linear but this assumption is not rejected when we include a dummy variable for 
Nordic countries instead of the Scandinavian dummy variable.  Apart from that, the 
results are very similar and we only present (11a) in table 1.  We check for normality of 
the predicted residuals by applying the inter-quartile range test
13 that assumes symmetry 
of the distribution. The presence of any severe outlier is sufficient evidence to reject 
normality at the 5% level. We found one severe outlier (Iran) and two middle outliers 
(Indonesia and The Netherlands).  In Iran, the percentage of respondents who agree that 
most people can be trusted is 65.3% (one percentage less than Sweden) among the 
interviewees who answer yes/no to the trust question.  Among the countries included in 
the WVS, the percentage of interviewees that did not answer the question or did not know 
is negligible except for Iran with 24.1% and Indonesia with 11.8%.  Once we exclude 
Indonesia and Iran from the sample, we cannot reject the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality 
                                                 
12 In specification (10), the estimated coefficient of Gini is statistically significant at the 12% significance 
level.  
13 The test was written by Lawrence C. Hamilton and it is available in the Stata software. 
  14of the residuals at the 13% level
14.  The HIV prevalence variable presents a negative 
coefficient varying in size from -0.373 to -0.610 indicating that a one standard deviation 
increase in HIV prevalence will lead to at least 1 percentage point decline in trust after 
controlling for other determinants of social capital.   
The regressions presented in table 1 provide some support to the empirical 
relation between HIV prevalence and trust.  However, one has to bear in mind that the 
findings are subject to a number of caveats, including the possibility that the estimates are 
subject to endogeneity bias. Next, in table 2, we perform some additional tests to assess 
whether there is a fundamental change in the conclusions obtained, when we vary the 
specifications along various dimensions.  
As argued by Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), robustness is a multi-dimensional concept 
that cannot be analyzed using a single indicator. In this section, we will use the term 
“robustness” as referring to our attempt to assess whether the results obtained in the 
previous section are sensitive to how the dependent variable is measured,  changes in the 
explanatory variables used, to changes in the sample composition, and to the use of 
different econometric techniques. We will concentrate in particular on the statistical 
significance and size of the estimated effect of HIV prevalence on trust.  
First, using our most general specification (11), we include alternative measures 
of institutional quality. HIV prevalence is negative and statistically significant when 
including government effectiveness (12) or the voice and accountability variable (13) 
constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2006), but it is only statistically significant at the 13% 
level
15 when using the law and order index (14) constructed by ICRG in the period from 
1960-1995.  The size of the HIV estimated coefficient is similar to our previous results 
(10-11a).  
Subsequently, we limit the sample included in the regressions to developing 
countries exclusively, in order to check whether by considering only this sub-sample, one 
would observe changes in the results previously obtained. In fact, specification (15) 
                                                 
14  We report that changing the definition of the dependent variable from the percentage “among the 
interviewees who answered the trust question” to the percentage of trusting respondents among “all people 
interviewed including the don’t know and missing” does not change the results qualitatively.  The HIV 
estimated coefficient is -0.579 and statistically significant at the 2% level. 
 
15 This could be considered as acceptable given our small sample size. 
  15shows that most regressors are no longer statistically significant; nonetheless, HIV 
prevalence continues to present a negative and significant estimated coefficient
16. The 
estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in HIV prevalence is associated with 
0.5 percentage point reduction in social capital.  
Furthermore, we attempt to account for the fact that HIV prevalence might be 
endogenous to social capital by instrumenting for this variable using national data for 
male circumcision rates obtained from WHO (2007) and Drain et al. (2006) and a Sub-
Saharan African dummy variable. A number of other papers for African countries, 
notably Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) and Werker et al. (2006) in regressions for total fertility, 
school enrolment and economic growth, have used circumcision rates as an instrumental 
variable for HIV in the light of new medical evidence that male circumcision 
substantially reduces the risk of HIV transmission.    
 When using circumcision rates as the only instrumental variable, diagnostics for 
the first stage regression show that circumcision rates are negatively but insignificantly 
related to HIV prevalence.  One explanation for this is that the relation between 
circumcision and HIV is not as straightforward as predicted by clinical trials. Beegle and 
de Walque (2008) quote cases like Ethiopia and Cameroon where the difference in HIV 
between circumcised and uncircumcised males is very small.  Another explanation is that 
omitted variables might be underestimating the negative effect of circumcision on HIV.  
We are aware that the use of weak instruments in two stage least squares can be very 
misleading because it biases the estimated coefficients and the standard errors (Murray, 
2006) so we decided to add the  geographic variable Sub-Saharan African country to the 
list of instruments. According to WHO and UNAIDS, SSA is the poorest and the most 
HIV/AIDS affected region in the world (more then 2/3 of people infected live in SSA, 
more than 3/4 of all deaths were AIDS related in 2007). Although the results controlling 
for Scandinavian or Nordic countries are very similar
17, we prefer to present the latter 
where the RESET test cannot reject the null of no misspecification at 10% level.      
                                                 
16 We also tested the same specification but using government effectiveness or control of corruption instead 
of rule of law with similar results. 
17 The estimated coefficient of HIV prevalence is  9% smaller when controlling for Scandinavian instead of 
Nordic.  
  16Specifications (16) and (17) are two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regressions of 
trust on HIV prevalence, measures of institutional quality (rule of law and control of 
corruption), Gini coefficient and Nordic.  All the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant (except for Gini) and all have the expected signs.  The estimated coefficients 
for the instrumented HIV are -0.834 and -0.861, which are slightly higher than the ones 
presented so far.  
Although the Shea first stage partial R
2 and the Cragg-Donaldson F test show that 
our instrumental variables are not weak, we are aware of the possibility that circumcision 
rates are endogenous to national trust levels for religious or cultural reasons. If so, 
circumcision rates might not be an adequate instrument because it may be related to trust.  
In (18) we use Sub-Saharan Africa as the only instrumental variable and we obtain 
similar qualitative results as in (17).  
In addition, we follow a large strand of the literature on the impact of institutions 
on economic development by using the log of settler mortality as an instrument for 
institutional quality as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2001). Specification (19) is a 3SLS 
regression of trust on HIV prevalence (instrumented by Sub-Saharan Africa), control of 
corruption (instrumented by settler mortality) and the Gini coefficient.  The HIV 
prevalence and the Gini coefficient have the expected sign and are statistically significant 
whereas control of corruption is not. Nonetheless, one should interpret these results with 
caution given the very small sample size (we have data available for only 28 countries). 
  As a final check, we use instrumental variables on the sample of developing 
countries (20, 22).  Similar to our OLS estimates, HIV prevalence remains statistically 
significant but the rule of law variable and Gini coefficient are not.  It would have been 
desirable to test if HIV affects the change in the stock of social capital but unfortunately, 
our data is not rich enough to disentangle between stock and flows effects.  
Lastly, we report that although income inequality appears to be insignificantly 
correlated to trust in our 2SLS estimations, inspection of all our first stage regressions 
shows that Gini affects HIV prevalence positively and significantly.  Other authors such 
as Drain et al (2004) for developing countries, Plot et al (2007) for Africa and Holtgrave 
and Crosby (2003) for the United States have also found that, among other variables, 
income inequality predicts HIV prevalence (or AIDS for the United States). That is, 
  17income inequality might be affecting social capital indirectly through HIV/AIDS. This 
interesting relationship needs to be explained and explored further. 
Overall and given the limitations in quality and availability of data, our 
exploratory analysis provide empirical support to the idea that HIV/AIDS has a harmful 
effect on social capital.  Indeed, HIV/AIDS might considerably restrict development 
through this important channel.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The cross-country analysis performed in this study indicates that the notion that 
HIV/AIDS has deleterious effects on social capital at the country level has empirical 
support. Our preferred specifications suggest that the effect of HIV on  social capital is of 
the order of 0.61 to 0.86 which, evaluated at the point of means, implies a predicted 
elasticity of 0.023 to 0.032.  That is, if one moves from a country with a relatively low 
level of HIV prevalence, such as Estonia, to a country with relatively high level, such as 
Uganda, one would observe an approximate five-fold proportional increase in HIV 
prevalence and an 11% to 15% proportional decrease in trust. When we perform a similar 
exercise between Estonia and South Africa (where the HIV epidemic has reached 
catastrophic proportions), the decline in trust amounts to over 20%. 
The estimates also suggest that measures of social distance, such as the Gini 
coefficient for income inequality, population density and measures of control of 
corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness are likely to be important 
determinants of social capital as well. The findings reported are subject to several caveats 
i.e. problems of data availability, measurement error, omitted variables and limitations of 
econometric techniques. Nonetheless, the negative impact of HIV prevalence on social 
capital is reasonably robust to changes in explanatory variables, estimation methods and 
sample composition.   
The HIV/AIDS epidemic represents a significant barrier to development on a 
number of dimensions. The implications of the disease in terms of productivity, human 
capital, savings and fiscal policy among others, have been subject to significant empirical 
scrutiny. This study intended to fill a gap in terms of assessing and confirming the 
empirical importance of the impact of the disease on social capital. It provides another 
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reason to support the validity of efforts being undertaken to address the potentially large 
social impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on development.  Therefore, it highlights an 
additional channel that needs to be considered in the policy debate and prompts the need 
for further work in this area.  For instance, future research should concentrate on 
designing a theoretical model linking HIV/AIDS, social capital and economic growth as 
well as exploring further the association between income inequality, HIV/AIDS and 
social capital. Table 1: HIV/AIDS and Social Capital OLS Estimates  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10  11  11a  11b 
HIV    -0.734***  -0.771***  -0.851***  -0.766***  -0.760**  -0.986*  -0.483**  -0.605**  -0.424*  -0.507**  -0.575**  -0.610**  -0.373** 
    (0.200)  (0.199)  0.200  0.193  0.241  0.357  0.250  0.311  0.229  0.254  0.272  0.272  0.165 
Control 
corruption    1.977  4.665**                
      2.171  1.624                
Rule of law        5.248**  5.216***  5.740***  4.650***  7.010**  3.963  5.402**  7.424***  6.486***  6.928*** 
        1.625  1.467  1.596  1.567  2.168  3.909  1.642  1.870  1.729  1.683 
Ethnic  fraction       -0.394           
         6.889                
Linguistic  fraction       9.247           
           6.823              
GINI           -11.148*  -12.953**  -12.981***  -10.253  -17.999***  -15.045***  -15.277*** 
           6.485  6.170  6.689  6.553  7.177  6.761  5.921 
Education            -5.788        
            4.255        
Initial  income           0.812       
             3.608      
Population  dens             -2.565***  -3.017***  -2.646***  -2.434*** 
               0.671  0.621  0.594  0.674 
Age                -0.629**  -0.550**  -0.334 
                 0.324  0.312  0.284 
Scandinavian  29.027***  27.737***  27.443***  27.301***  27.255***  28.254***  25.467***  23.237***  24.840***  23.989***  22.246***    
   3.445  4.009  4.011  3.753  4.063  4.026  4.182  4.630  4.361  4.299  4.324     
Nordic                  25.428***  24.468*** 
                  3.715  3.420 
LDC  -10.853***  -7.068**                 
    3.163  3.635                 
Constant    34.341  31.365  25.865  25.212  25.361  22.302  64.474  80.201  64.660  61.622  106.433  93.566  86.719 
    2.613  3.376  1.655  1.696  2.605  1.988  22.838  23.057  39.414  23.101  30.656  28.663  25.927 
N    79 78 78 78 78 76 75 65  72  73 72  72  70 
R-squared    0.381 0.385 0.358  0.37  0.390 0.412  0.425  0.466  0.435  0.444  0.466  0.508  0.643 
RESET    0.6535 0.039 0.0382  0.087 0.081 0.472  0.044  0.3271  0.115  0.020  0.019  0.111  0.080 
The dependent variable is trust.  White-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *** , **  and  *  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level. N is the number of 
observations.  RESET refers to p-values for the Ramsey’s RESET  (Ho is that the model is linear). 11b excludes Iran and Indonesia .  




  12  13 14 15 16 17 18  19  20  21 
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS(LDC)    2SLS  2SLS
  2SLS
a 3SLS  2SLS(LDC)  2SLS
a(LDC) 
HIV  -0.513**  -0.604**  -0.503  -0.548**  -0.834**  -0.861*  -0.690*  -1.066*  -1.024*  -0.815* 
  (0.258)  (0.284)  (0.325  (0.271  (0.500)  (0.492)  (0.416)  (0.576)  (0.572)  (0.466) 
           4.291**  3.724**  1.991    
           (1.486)  (1.456)  (2.288)    
Rule of law        -2.236  4.438**       -2.476  -2.212 
       (2.563)  (1.518)       (2.495)  (2.415) 
Govt Effectiv  8.522***              
  (1.906)              
Voice & Account    4.251*             
   (2.528)             
Law & Order      3.395*            
     (1.794)            
GINI  -22.565**  -15.845*  -13.766  -6.283  -7.483  -7.816  -8.451  -39.432***  -4.9673  -4.871 
  (7.138)  (8.332)  (9.928)  (6.059)  (7.120)  (7.206)  (6.343)  (9.230)  (7.074)  (6.303) 
Population dens  -3.722***  -0.903  -1.624**            
  (0.701)  (0.560)  (0.729)            
Age  -0.846**  -0.302  -0.258            
  (0.375)  (0.332)  (0.447)            
Scandinavian  21.092***  27.713***  26.339***            
  (3.835)  (4.744)  (4.908)            
Nordic         27.359***  26.698***  28.212***     
         (3.735)  (4.011)  (3.876)     
Constant  128.079***  90.394***  70.987*  44.857**  51.912**  53.496***  55.248***  172.138***  40.889*  40.193* 
  (31.603)  (35.514)  (39.460)  (21.127)  (24.681)  (25.006)  (22.092  (34.161)  (24.302)  (21.782) 
Observations  72  73  59  50  70  70  75  26  47  50 
R-squared  0.509  0.373  0.420  0.091  0.489  0.484  0.471  0.454  0.072  0.083 
RESET  0.037  0.268  0.314  0.527  0.136  0.195  0.280    0.0510  0.157 
Shea partial R
2         0.595  0.600  0.566    0.609  0.569 
Cragg-Donaldson         0.004  0.004  0.002    0.004  0.003 










































The dependent variables is trust.  White -corrrected standard errors in parentheses. *** , **  and  *  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  
level. N is the number of observations.  RESET refers to p-values for the Ramsey RESET test for OLS  or the Ramsey/Pesaran-Taylor RESET test for 
2SLS. HIV  instrumented by circumcision rate and Sub-Saharan African dummy except in 
a  where only the latter is used as instrument. In 3SLS,  HIV 
instrumented by Sub-Saharan Africa and rule of law instrumented by settler mortality.  Cragg-Donaldson refers to p- values for validity of excluded 
instruments in the first stage regression. Hansen J refers to p-values for testing overidentifying restrictions 
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Appendix A 
 
List of Countries Included in Regressions 
 
 
Albania Ecuador  Korea  Saudi  Arabia 
Algeria Egypt  Latvia  Serbia/Montenegro 
Argentina El  Salvador Lithuania  Singapore 
Armenia Estonia  Luxembourg  Slovakia 
Australia Finland    Macedonia  Slovenia 
Austria  France   Malta  South Africa 
Azerbaijan Georgia  Mexico  Spain 
Bangladesh Germany  Moldova  Sweden 
Belarus Ghana  Morocco  Switzerland 
Belgium Greece  Netherlands  Tanzania 
Bosnia Hungary  New  Zealand  Turkey 
Bulgaria Iceland  Nigeria Uganda 
Brazil India  Norway  Ukraine 
Canada Indonesia Pakistan  United  Kingdom 
Chile   Iran  Peru  United States 
Colombia Ireland  Philippines  Uruguay 
Croatia Israel Poland  Venezuela 
Czech Rep  Italy  Portugal  Vietnam 
Denmark Japan Romania  Zimbabwe 





















  26  27
Appendix B 
Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description  Source 
HIV   HIV prevalence rate (%) in 2003 or HIV prevalence from 
pregnant women from 1990-1998 or earliest available 
thereafter.  
World Bank (WDI, 
World Development 
Indicators), UNAIDS, 
US Census Bureau. 
Trust   % of valid respondents answering that most persons can 
be trusted. Latest available data (1996-2003), but also 
estimates performed with earliest available for each 
country and averages over different survey waves. .  
World Value Survey 
Control of 
corruption 
Estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset, Kaufmann 
et al. (2006). 
Rule of law  Estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset, Kaufmann 
et al. (2006). 
Government 
effectiveness 
Estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset, Kaufmann 
et al. (2006). 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset, Kaufmann 
et al. (2006). 
Law and Order   Average score 1960-1995  ICRG 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
Various years (1983 to 2001)  Alesina et al. (2003). 
Linguistic 
fractionalisation 
Various years (1983 to 2001)  Alesina et al. (2003). 
Gini    In logs, average for the period 1980-1997 or earliest 
available data thereafter.  
WDI 
Education  In logs, years of education attained for population aged 25 
and over in 1985 or earliest available thereafter. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
and  WDI 
Initial income  Log of real per capita GDP in 1985, USD at PPP We also 
tried using 1996 data. 




1996 population density (1000 people per sq km)  US Census Bureau  
Age  Average age of population in 1996  US Census Bureau  
Settler Mortality  In logs, mortality rates by first European settlers in the 
colonies. 




In logs, percentage of male  circumcision (several years)  Drain et al. (2006) 
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Trust 81  27.610  14.885  2.830  66.530 
HIV 79  1.035  3.342  0.05  22.11 
Rule of Law  80  0.442  1.021  -1.205  2.169 
Control Corruption   80  0.377  1.050  -1.200  2.238 
Govt Effectiv  80  0.518  1.060  -1.217  2.505 
Voice&Acc 81  0.339  0.965  -1.490  1.760 
Ethnic Fract  80  0.356  0.228  0.002  0.930 
Ling  Fract  79  0.313  0.266  0.002  0.923 
Law&Order 66  3.941  1.486  1.271  6.000 
Gini 76  3.554  0.246  3.073  4.081 
Education 69  1.830  0.446  0.631  2.448 
Initial Income  78  8.429  0.975  6.263  9.854 
Populat dens  78  0.208  0.692  0.002  6.016 
Age 78  28.470  6.072  16.610  36.460 
Settler Mort  29  4.154  1.196  2.146  7.603 






































Gini Education  Initial 
income 
Populat 
dens  Age  Settler 
Mortal  Circumc LDC 
                            
HIV  1                       
Rule of Law  -0.16 1                             
Control 
Corruption   -0.12 0.96*  1                           
Govt Effectiv  -0.17 0.96*  0.95*  1                         
Voice&Acc  -0.12 0.87*  0.87*  0.88*  1                       
Ethnic Fract  0.29* -0.44*  -0.43*  -0.40*  -0.47*  1                     
Ling  Fract  0.34* -0.25  -0.25  -0.21  -0.31*  0.69*  1                   
Law&Order  -0.26 0.82*  0.78*  0.77*  0.77*  -0.41*  -0.29  1                 
Gini  0.36* -0.23 -0.23  -0.18  -0.22  0.35* 0.10 -0.51*  1               
Education  -0.33* 0.61* 0.60*  0.62*  0.70*  -0.35*  -0.29 0.70* -0.43*  1             
Initial Income  -0.29  0.87* 0.85*  0.88* 0.83*  -0.44*  -0.39* 0.77*  -0.23  0.70*  1           
Populat dens  -0.06 0.18 0.20  0.24  0.04  -0.07  0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.03  0.17 1         
Age  -0.31* 0.58* 0.56*  0.60*  0.67*  -0.44*  -0.28 0.77* -0.64* 0.79* 0.65* 0.02  1       
Settler Mort  0.06 -0.73*  -0.74*  -0.73*  -0.75*  0.40 0.32 -0.59 0.07  -0.66  -0.75  -0.22 -0.71  1     
Circumcision  -0.06 -0.26  -0.26  -0.29  -0.46*  0.22 0.30 -0.42 0.09  -0.34  -0.28  0.13 -0.53 0.20  1   
LDC  0.17  -0.77*  0.43* 0.20 -0.70* 0.22  -0.47*  -0.81*  -0.21 -0.58*  0.69* 0.21  1 
 
 